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WILL THE REAL MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES
PLEASE STAND UP?*
Q - In your testimony, you made the statement that the buyers
in your opinion are professional. Are you claiming they are
professional in this hearing? Are you taking the position
they are managerial or are you taking the position they are
professional employees?
A - I said they are considered like professional employees in the
company.
Q - You are not taking the position these buyers are professional?
A - Im not taking any position. rm saying they are managerial
as far as what they do. The type of work they perform is
managerial in nature.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The courts and the National Labor Relations Board2 have used the
terms "managerial" and "managerial employee" to describe a wide
variety of both employment characteristics and individual employees
since the Wagner Act3 was passed in 1935. Without attempting to
specifically define managerial employee, a sharply divided Supreme
Court recently held that employees properly found to be managerial are
not protected by the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).4 The
forty-year judicial, administrative, and legislative history leading to this
decision, as well as its immediate and potential ramifications upon
American labor relations, are the subject of this Comment.
II. PRE-TAFT-HARTLEY DBVELOPMENTS
The Wagner Act defined "employee" broadly.5 The only classifica-
* The student author is a Field Examiner with the National Labor Relations Board.
The opinions expressed herein are entirely those of the author, and do not reflect the
views of the National Labor Relations Board, Office of General Counsel, or any member
thereof.
1. Record at 25-26, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
2. Hereinafter the Board.
3. Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 150 et seq.
(1970).
4. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). The Court refrained from
promulgating a definition of "managerial," deferring instead to the Board. Id. at 289-90.
5. Section 2(3) of the 1935 N.L.R.A. provided:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless -the Act explicitly states otherwise, and
1975] MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES
tions specifically excluded by statute were agricultural workers, domestic
servants and members of the employer's immediate family.6 However,
not all workers who fit the statutory definition of employee were in-
cluded in every unit.7 Through the years the size, scope, composition,
and number of units came to depend upon a myriad of factors. Since the
shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in con-
nection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment,
but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the
domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed
by his parent or spouse.
Once an employee, then certain rights accrued:
Section 7 of the 1935 N.L.R.A. provided:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.
So too certain protections from interference with those rights by employers or their
agents exist:
Section 8 of the 1935 N.L.R.A. provided:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(I) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7.
(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor or-
ganization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject to
rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to section 6(a),
an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him
during working hours without loss of time or pay.
(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor or-
ganization ....
(4) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has
filed charges or given testimony under this Act.
(5) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, sub-
ject to the provisions of section 9(a) of this title.
6. Of course those employed by "non-employers" under section 2(2) were not
"employees." Section 2(2) of the 1935 N.L.R.A. provided:
The term "employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, di-
rectly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States, or any State or political
subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended
from time to time, or any labor organization ....
7. The term "unit" refers to that group of employees who will be represented by a
union should a majority of the employees voting within that group so choose.
Section 9(b) of the 1935 N.L.R.A. provided:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to insure to employees the
full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, and
otherwise to effectuate the policies of this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivi-
sion thereof.
The Board's discretion is indeed broad. The unit need not be the most appropriate, but
only appropriate enough to insure to employees in each case "the fullest freedom in ex-
ercising the rights guaranteed by this Act." Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B.
409, 418 (1950). See also NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 134 (1944);
Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 165-66 (1940); Parsons Inv. Co., 152
N.L.R.B. 192, 193 n.1 (1965).
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union seeking to represent a unit of employees was not required to seek
the largest possible unit,8 practical politics9 as well as the desires of the
petitioner' ° were always relevant, unless clearly contrary to established
Board policy."' Also relevant to unit determination were the employees'
desires,' 2 the collective bargaining history,' 3 and most significantly, the
community of interest of the employees.' 4 Thus, few statutory limits
were placed on the Board's ability to determine unit appropriateness."5
All other exclusions of employees were based upon the Board's own
policy in the circumstances of each case. It is in this broad category of
"policy" exclusions that the term "managerial employee" had its genesis.
A. Exclusion of Supervisors by the Board
Within its first two years, the Board had developed a policy of
excluding individuals connected with management from units of rank
and file employees.'" Broadly classified as "supervisors," these individu-
als were excluded because they lacked a community of interest with
other employees.' 7 Among the indicia of supervisors were their ability to
hire and fire'8 and their association with management.' 9 The "associa-
8. Such is the current state of the law. See, e.g., Purity Food Stores, Inc., 160 N.L.R.B.
651 (1966); Bamberger's Paramus, 151 N.L.R.B. 748 (1965); P. Ballantine & Sons, 141
N.L.R.B. 1103 (1963).
9. An unspoken but critically important element in every argument for either exclu-
sion or inclusion under section 9 is how the individual employee at issue will vote. Note,
however, that section 9(c) (5) of the present statute prohibits unit determination merely
on the basis of extent of organization: "In determining whether a unit is appropriate for
the purposes specified in subsection (b) the extent to which the employees have organ-
ized shall not be controlling." 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5) (1970). See also Quality Food
Markets, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 349 (1960).
10. See, e.g., Glosser Bros., 93 N.L.R.B. 1343 (1951).
11. See, e.g., Marks Oxygen Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 228, 230 (1964).
12. See, e.g., Ideal Laundry Dry Cleaning Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1112 (1963), vacated,
330 F.2d 712, 717 (10th Cir. 1964), on remand, 152 N.L.R.B. 1130 (1965).
13. See, e.g., Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1549 (1965); West Virginia
Pulp & Paper Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1281, 1284 (1958).
14. Community of interest is still the overriding consideration in unit determination
and is itself predicated upon a multiplicity of factors: functional organization of the
plant, International Paper Co. (So. Kraft Division), 96 N.L.R.B. 295, 298 n.7 (1951);
functional integration, Transway, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 885 (1965); common supervision,
Maybee Stone Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 487 (1960). See 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 116 (1936) and
cases cited therein.
15. See notes 5 & 6 supra and accompanying text.
16. 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 136 (1937).
17. Id. at 137 and cases cited therein.
18. These characteristics were later adopted by Congress in its definition of supervisor
in the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970). See note 57
infra.
19. See note 35 infra.
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tion with management" factor was the precursor of the present manage-
rial status controversy.20
Due in large part to the broad scope of the section 2(3) employee
under the Wagner Act,"' the Board's policy of exclusion from units in
the years between the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts was marked by
caution, uncertainty, and abrupt change. In the early years the Board
found itself excluding diverse workers, usually deferring to the desires of
the incumbent or petitioning union or to a compromise negotiated
between rival unions. In this fashion, supervisors were excluded at the
request of almost any bona fide union where it could be established that
they lacked a community of interest with other unit employees. 2 In
addition the Board, acting on its own, often excluded certain categories
of workers.23 Thus the wishes of the parties, especially the unions, were
usually, but not always, the determining factor as to what employees
would make up the unit or units in any given plant.
In time, the Board began defining with greater precision the terms
which it used to classify employees. As early as 1941, a definition of
confidential employee appeared but applied only to those employees
having access to matters bearing on labor relations.24 In 1943, a policy
definition of supervisor appeared which substantially paralleled the def-
inition Congress would adopt in 1947.35 The term "managerial," how-
ever, continued in use without clear definition.
B. Exclusion of Managerials by th Board
Intense production in the mid-war years gave rise to a rash of
organizing among foremen. This provided fertile ground for litigation of
20. See 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 137 (1937). See also note 35 infra and accompanying
text.
21. See note 5 supra.
22. See 4 NLRB ANN. REP. 93-94 & nn.84-85 (1939). In addition, the following
categories were also excluded at the behest of unions: maintenance employees, watch-
men, timekeepers and factory clerks; outside employees such as salesmen, clerical and
office workers; technical and professional employees such as doctors and nurses, labora-
tory workers and engineers. Id. at 95 & nn.90-96.
23. Watchmen, time keepers, factory clerks, stenographers, technical and professional
employees were excluded. Id. at 95 & nn.97-99, 1.
24. See Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 108 (1941).
25. As a general rule, it is our policy to exclude from the appropriate unit employ-
ees who supervise or direct the work of employees therein, and who have authority
to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of
such employees, or whose official recommendations concerning such action are ac-
corded effective weight.
Douglas Aircraft Co., 50 N.L.R.B. 784, 787 (1943). See 29 U.S.C. 152(11) (1970) and
note 57 infra.
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the managerial issue. In 1942, the expression "closely related to man-
agement" became a basis for excluding time study men. 20 By 1943, the
term "managerial function" was used, but usually in conjunction with
descriptions of supervisory authority and confidential relationships to
management. The three terms confidential, managerial and supervisory
were frequently used interchangeably and the concomitant confusion
persists to this day.2 The year 1944 was a banner year for "managerial"
proliferation. In January, assistant buyers who possessed no authority to
hire, fire, or discipline were excluded from employee units as supervisors
because their "interests . . . [were] identified with management. '2
February witnessed managerial exclusions for executives who "deal with
matters relating to labor relations and determine labor relations poli-
cy,"" and for buyers and expediters because of the higher degree of
skill and responsibility entailed in their jobs. 1 March provided a distinc-
tion between confidential employees and buyers closely allied with
management. 2 In April, the Board actually used the term "managerial"
twice to exclude those who could commit the employer's credit.33 Yet in
October, the Board considered the same trait an indicator of supervisory
status without mentioning the term "managerial. 34
Throughout 1945 and 1946, the use of the term "managerial" in
conjunction with those of "supervisory," "confidential," and "adminis-
trative" continued and the attendant connotations mushroomed. 8 Final-
26. See Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 45 N.L.R.B. 826, 829 (1942); Gar Wood
Indus., 41 N.L.R.B. 1157 (1942). See also Oliver Farm Equip. Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 1078,
1082-83 (1943); Julien P. Friez & Sons, 47 N.L.R.B. 43, 47 (1943).
27. See Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., 54 N.L.R.B. 103, 107, 110 (1943).
28. See notes 35 & 144 infra and accompanying text.
29. J.L. Brandeis & Sons, 54 N.L.R.B. 880, 884 (1944).
30. Armour & Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1462, 1465 n.8 (1944).
31. Dravo Corp., 54 N.L.R.B. 1174, 1176-77 (1944). The notion that an employee
with a high degree of skill is thereby properly denied the protection of the Act is hardly
logical.
32. See Hudson Motor Car Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 509, 512 (1944).
33. See Inland Steel Container Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 138, 141 (1944); Spicer Mfg. Corp.,
55 N.L.R.B. 1491, 1494 (1944).
34. See Vulcan Corp., 58 N.L.R.B. 733, 736 (1944); See also Micamold Radio Corp.,
58 N.L.R.B. 888, 890 (1944).
35. See, e.g., Barrett Div., Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. 903, 905 (1946)
(assistant buyers "function closely allied to management"); Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,
64 N.L.R.B. 547, 553-55 (1945) (commercial engineers found to be "managerial
employees"); Aluminum Co. of America, 61 N.L.R.B. 1066, 1075-78 (1945) (senior
account clerks, administrative assistants, material clerks, department planners, sales
administrators, found to be "managerial administrative employees"); Murray Ohio Mfg.,
61 N.L.R.B. 47, 55-57 (1945) (time study men found to be "managerial employees
bearing a confidential relationship to the company"); Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 60
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ly, in Ford Motor Co.,36 the Board attempted to distinguish among
the terms and defined managerial employees as
executive employees who are in a position to formulate, determine, and
effectuate management policies. These employees we have considered
and still deem to be "managerial," in that they express and make opera-
tive the decisions of management.3 7
Such categories as supervisors, 8 and others,19 were to be excluded from
units of rank and file employees. Confidential employees were confined
to the limited classification of "those employees who assist and act in a
confidential capacity to persons who exercise 'managerial' functions in
the field of labor relations. 40
C. Rights of "Managerials" and Supervisors to Organize
The exclusion of certain classes of employees from units as a matter
of Board policy prompted such excluded employees to pose the related
question of whether or not they had any right to organize into units of
their own. With respect to fringe groups of "miscellaneous employ-
ees," 41 the Board normally permitted organization into separate units.
42
The Board's position with respect to supervisors, though, vacillated.
Taking one position, it certified a separate unit of supervisors who
sought representation by a union independent of that representing the
rank and file workers.43 It then changed its approach and approved a
N.L.R.B. 626 (1945) (time study men found to have "interests and functions sufficiently
akin to those of management").
36. 66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946). A footnote stated somewhat cryptically that
[S]upervisory personnel have also been excluded from units of rank and file employ-
ees." Id. at n.1l. The Board found that time-study workers were not managerial.
37. Id. at 1322 (footnote omitted).
38. Such high level employees would also be supervisors but at this time the Board
does not clearly distinguish the two. Id. at 1322 n.11.
39. The Board continued to exclude office clericals and technical employees. See 11
NLRB ANN. REp. 32 (1946) and cases cited therein.
40. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946). This limited definition has been
followed consistently by the Board to date. See, e.g., Bechtel Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. No. 126,
88 L.R.R.M. 1082 (1974).
41. See, e.g., 6 NLRB ANN. REP. 69 (1941).
42. See, e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1943) (separate unit of
timekeepers); Armour & Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 688 (1943) (separate unit of plant clerks);
Chrysler Corp., 44 N.L.R.B. 881 (1942) (separate unit of guards).
43. In Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942), the Board certified a unit
of supervisors noting the countless court decisions entitling them to protection under
section 8(3) of the Act. The Board also relied on parallel legislation in Congress, namely
the Railway Labor Act where Congress had described those entitled to the protection of
that Act as "an employee or subordinate official." Id. at 966 n.4.
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unit of supervisors represented by the same union as that representing
the rank and file.4 Within a year a divided Board reversed itself again
in Maryland Drydack Co.,4  and decided as a matter of policy that
no unit composed of supervisors could be appropriate, notwithstanding
the protection that supervisors enjoyed as "employees" before the Board
and the courts under sections 2(3), 7 and 8 of the Act. Thus, the state
of the law following Maryland Drydock was that some classifications of
workers, such as agricultural employees, were denied the right to organ-
ize by statute.46 Others, though entitled to organize by statute, were
limited, as a matter of Board policy, to units distinct from those of other
employees.47 Finally, though supervisors enjoyed the protections of
statutory employees before the Board and the courts, this protection
was hollow since the Board's policy effectively precluded their ability to
organize.
48
The status of confidential and managerial employees during this
period was uncertain. Since most of those defined as confidential em-
ployees were executive secretaries, there was rarely a sufficient number
of confidential employees in any one plant to merit consideration of
whether or not a unit of confidential employees would be appropriate. 40
As to managerials, the Board in one case implied that such employees
were entitled to the protection of the Act and might be appropriately
certified in a separate unit, but since separate units of expediters and
buyers were seldom at issue, none were certified.50
44. See Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 874 (1942).
45. 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943).
46. See notes 5 & 6 supra.
47. See note 42 supra.
48. The Board noted that certain circuit courts of appeals at the time considered
supervisors statutory employees entitled to the Act's protection. Maryland Drydock Co.,
49 N.L.R.B. 733, 738 & n.3 and cases cited therein. The dissent emphasized the custom
of collective bargaining among supervisors in the maritime and railroad industries. Id. at
743 n.3.
49. In one of the few cases to present the issue, the Board held that a unit of
confidential employees would be inappropriate. The decision is subsequent to NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), but the Board makes no mention of it. The
employees are "excluded from participation in a representation election." The Board is
careful to avoid saying that such employees are not "employees" within the meaning of
the Act. Pullman Standard Div. of Pullman, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B., No. 100, slip 5, 87
L.R.R.M. 1370, 1371 (1974). See also notes 122 & 124 infra.
50. Dravo Corp., 54 N.L.R.B. 1174, 1177 (1944). At issue was the status of
employees known as buyers and expediters. These categories were later classified as
managerial by the Board, although clearly outside the limited scope of the Ford Motor




Within another year the Board did another about-face on the supervi-
sory question, once again certifying a unit of foremen51 and then suc-
cessfully litigating in the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court an unfair
labor practice against the employer for its refusal to bargain with that
unit. 2 The Board and the courts were sharply divided on the subject of
supervisors. The decisions usually split along the lines of those who felt
bound by the broad unlimited congressional definition of employee,
which did not specifically exclude supervisors, and those who deemed it
an inherent conflict of interest that supervisors be permitted to organize
into units with their subordinates.5"
IH. TAFT-HARTLEY CLARIFICATION
A. The Congressional View
The 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments resolved the status of most
classes of employees with the exception of managerial employees. The
term managerial fails to appear even once in the 1680 page legislative
history.54 The definition of employer was modified slightly.55 The term
51. Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945).
52. Packard Motor Car Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 1212 (1945), enforced, 157 F.2d 80 (6th
Cir. 1946), aff'd, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
53. Id. See also Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945). Few subjects were as
avidly discussed in the legal journals of the day. See, e.g., Cooper, Status of Foremen as
"Employees" under the National Labor Relations Act, 15 FORD. L. Rav. 191 (1946);
Cox, The LMRA 1947-Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947
(pts. 1-2), 61 HAIv. L. Rav. 1, 274 (1947); Iserman, Unionization of Supervisors;
Against the Legality of the NLRB Ruling, 32 A.B.A.J. 875 (1946); Rothenberg, Fore-
men-The Industrial Question Mark, 51 DICK. L. REv. 211 (1947); 59 HAxv. L. REv.
606 (1946); 32 IowA L. Rnv. 595 (1947); 21 TuL. L. REv. 492 (1947); 95 U. PA. L.
REv. 802 (1947); 33 VA. L. Rv. 214 (1947); 1947 Wis. L. REv. 415. Or in Congress,
Hearings on H.R. 992, 1728, 1742, 2239 Before the Subcomm. on Full Utilization of
Manpower of the House Comm. on Military Affairs, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).
Following Union and Godchaux, H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) was intro-
duced. Popularly known as the "Case bill," it would have excluded supervisors from the
protection of the Act. It passed both houses, but failed to overcome a veto by President
Truman. 92 CONG. Rac. 6674-78 (1946).
54. See LEGISLATIvE HIsToRY OF THE LABOR MANAGMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947
(1948). But see note 143 infra.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970) provides:
The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, di-
rectly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned
Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political
subdivision thereof, or any corporation or association operating a hospital, if no
part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individ-
ual, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time,
or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone act-
ing in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
(Italics indicate new provision).
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"employee" came to exclude supervisors and independent contractors
in addition to agricultural laborers, domestic workers, and those em-
ployed by parents or spouses. 56 Supervisor was defined much as the
Board had defined it in earlier decisions.5 7 Professional employees
were defined,58 and special provision was made for the certification of
separate units of professional employees and guards.59
The congressional debate preceding the enactments of the amend-
ment provides some insight into the legislative intent with respect to
56. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970) provides:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states other-
wise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of,
or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor prac-
tice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent em-
ployment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer,
or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual
employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an inde-
pendent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual
employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time
to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
(Italics indicate new provision).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970) provides:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, as-
sign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to ad-
just their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with
the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
See also note 25 supra and accompanying text.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1970) provides:
The term "professional employee" means-
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied
in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work;
(ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance;
(iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot
be standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of
an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a pro-
longed course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of
higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education
or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental,
manual, or physical processes; or
(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellec-
tual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of subparagraph (a), and (ii)
is performing related work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify
himself to become a professional employee as defined in said paragraph (a).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Provided, That the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for
such purposes if such unit includes both professional employees and employees who
are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees
vote for inclusion in such unit; . . . (3) decide that any unit is appropriate for such
purposes if it includes, together with other employees, any individual employed as
a guard to enforce against employees and other persons rules to protect property
of the employer or to protect the safety of persons on the employer's premises; but
no labor organization shall be certified as the representative of employees in a bar-
gaining unit of guards if such organization admits to membership, or is affiliated
directly or indirectly with an organization which admits to membership, employees
other than guards.
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some of those who might broadly be considered managerials under the
Ford Motor"0 "executive employee" criterion, but no sound conclusions
follow. The original house bill6 defined supervisors in three broad cat-
egories: (1) those, as defined in the 1946 Case bill,62 who had the au-
thority to hire and fire; (2) those involved in personnel and labor rela-
tions; and (3) so-called "confidential employees," although the use of
the term was much broader than that defined by the Board in Ford
Motor.63 In reporting the bill, the committee majority voiced its dis-
pleasure with the "expertness" of the Board in defining "employee"
and castigated the Supreme Court for crediting the Board with so much
expertise.64 The Report then attempted to justify the use of its broader
60. See note 37 supra & note 112 infra and accompanying text.
61. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(12) (1947).
62. H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); see note 53 supra.
63. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(12) (1947) provided:
The term "supervisor" means any individual-
(A) who has authority, in the interest of the employer-
(i) to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, demote, discharge, assign,
reward or discipline any individuals employed by the employer, or to adjust their
grievances, or to effectively recommend any such action; or
(ii) to determine, or make effective recommendations with respect to, the
amount of wages earned by any individuals employed by the employer, or to apply,
or to make effective recommendations with respect to the application of, the factors
upon the basis of which the wages of any individuals employed by the employer
are determined, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority
is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the exercise of independent
judgment;
(B) who is employed in labor relations, personnel, employment, police, or time-
study matters or in connection with claims matters of employees against employers,
or who is employed to act in other respects for the employer in dealing with other
individuals employed by the employer, or who is employed to secure and furnish
to the employer information to be used by the employer in connection with any
of the foregoing; or
(C) who by the nature of his duties is given by the employer information that
is of a confidential nature, and that is not available to the public, to competitors,
or to employees generally, for use in the interest of the employer.
See notes 36 & 37 supra and accompanying text.
64. An "employee," according to all standard dictionaries, according to the law
as the courts have stated it, and according to the understanding of almost everyone,
with the exception of members of the National Labor Relations Board, means some-
one who works for another for hire. But in the case of National Labor Relations
Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc. (322 U.S. 111 (1944)), the Board expanded the
definition of the term "employee" beyond anything that it ever had included before,
and the Supreme Court, relying upon the theoretic "expertness" of the Board, up-
held the Board. In this case the Board held independent merchants who bought
newspapers from the publisher and hired people to sell them to be "employees".
The people the merchants hired to sell the papers were "employees" of the
merchants, but holding the merchants to be "employees" of the publisher of the
papers was most far reaching. It must be presumed that when Congress passed the
Labor Act, it intended words it used to have the meanings that they had when Con-
gress passed the act, not new meanings that, 9 years later, the Labor Board might
think up. In the law, there always has been a difference, and a big difference, be-
tween "employees" and "independent contractors". "Employees" work for wages or
salaries under direct supervision. "Independent contractors" undertake to do a job
for a price, decide how the work will.be done, usually hire others to do the work,
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definition on the grounds that in addition to executives who were al-
ready excluded from the Act,.5 Congress should also see to it that those
with access to trade secrets and competitive information be excluded.60
The vitriolic House Majority Report was bitterly denounced by the
House Minority 7 and coldly received in the Senate. 8 The Senate opted
and depend for their income not upon wages, but upon the difference between what
they pay for goods, materials, and labor and what they receive for the end result,
that is, upon profits. It is inconceivable that Congress, when it passed the act, au-
thorized the Board to give to every word in the act whatever meaning it wished.
On the contrary, Congress intended then, and intends now, that the Board give to
words not far-fetched meanings but ordinary meanings. To correct what the Board
has done, and what the Supreme Court, putting misplaced reliance upon the Board's
expertness, has approved, the bill excludes "independent contractors" from the defi-
nition of "employee".
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947). For an in-depth analysis of the
political climate prevailing at the time, see H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER
Acr To TAFT-HARTLEY (1950) hereinafter cited as MiILLis & BROWN].
65. (12) "Supervisor": In the discussion of the definition of the term "employee,"
the reasons for excluding from that definition persons who act for employers in the
employer's dealings with labor have been fully set forth. The substantive language
of section 2(12) of the present bill is consistent with that of the Case bill, which
passed Congress last year. The only important change concerns confidential em-
ployees. These are people who receive from their employers information that not
only is confidential but also that is not available to the public, or to competitors,
or to employees generally. Most of the people who would qualify as "confidential"
employees are executives and are excluded from the act in any event.
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947). See also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 283-84 n.12 (1974).
66. The Board, itself, normally excludes from bargaining units confidential clerks
and secretaries to such people as these. But protecting confidential financial infor-
mation from competitors and speculators, protecting secret processes and experi-
ments from competitors, and protecting other vital secrets ought not to rest in the
administrative discretion of the Board or on the responsibility of whatever union
happens to represent the employees. The bill therefore excludes from the definition
of employees persons holding positions of trust and confidence whose duties give
them secret information. The bill does not forbid these people to organize. It
merely leaves their organizing and bargaining activities outside the provisions of the
act.
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80 Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947).
67. 5. Supervisors
Section 2(12) purports to define the meaning of "supervisor"; actually, supervis-
ors play only a minor role in this definition, which clearly includes all persons hav-
ing only slight authority such as pushers, gang bosses, leaders, second hands, and
a host of similarly placed persons with no actual supervisory status. It is suffi-
ciently broad to cover a carpenter with a helper. In addition, it would include time-
study men, many types of pay-roll and plant clerks, plant guards, inspectors, and
other [sic] who have quite as much need of trade-union organization as other rank-
and-file employees. To deny to this large group of employees the protection of the
law, to give the employer the unlimited right to discharge them for union activities
and otherwise to interfere with their rights, is to penalize those employees who have
shown the most skill and conscientiousness in the performance of their duties. The
provisions of the bill are so broad that employers would be encouraged ostensibly
to place many employees in these categories in order to deprive them of their rights
under Federal legislation.
It is estimated that there are between 4 and 5 million men and women working
in supervisory jobs in this Nation's industry. The right of these employees to or-
ganize and bargain collectively in a manner which is insured to other workers will
be materially impaired by the proposed bill. The recognition of the necessity for
organization by workers as a means of achieving a fair share of the country's wealth
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for a narrower definition of supervisor similar to that in the Case bill 9
and this definition prevailed. 70 The House Conference Report demon-
strated the nature of the compromise that emerged: the more limited
Senate definition would apply, and other categories, such as managerial
employees, would be left once again to the discretion of the Board for
definition.
While the Board had excluded some employees from units of rank
and file production and maintenance units, it had certainly not consid-
ered such employees "outside the scope of the Act" as the Conference
is the gravamen of the National Labor Relations Act. The rejection of this princi-
ple in the case of supervisory employees can be considered only in terms of discrim-
ination against such employees.
Id. at 71.
68. In drawing an amendment to meet this situation, the committee has not been
unmindful of the fact that certain employees with minor supervisory duties have
problems which may justify their inclusion in that act. It has therefore distin-
guished between straw bosses, leadmen, set-up men, and other minor supervisory
employees, on the one hand, and the supervisor vested with such genuine manage-
ment prerogatives as the right to hire or fire, discipline, or make effective recom-
mendations with respect to such action. In other words the committee has adopted
the test which the Board itself has made in numerous cases when it has permitted
certain categories of supervisory employees to be included in the same bargaining
unit with the rank-and-file. (Bethlehem Steel Company, Sparrows Point Division,
65 N.L.R.B. 284 (expediters); Pittsburgh Equitable Meter Company, 61 N.LR.B.
880 (group leaders with authority to give instructions and to lay out the work);
Richards Chemical Works, 65 N.L.R.B. 14 (supervisors who are mere conduits for
transmitting orders); Endicott-Johnson, 67 N.LR.B. 1342, 1347 (persons having
the title of foreman and assistant foreman but with no authority other than to keep
production moving).
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947).
(11) "Supervisor": In framing this definition the committee exercised great care,
desiring that the employees herein excluded from the coverage of the act be truly
supervisory. The language in the proposed amendment is patterned after that con-
tained in the Ellender amendment to last year's Case bill which was adopted by
a majority vote of the Senate and concurred in by the House. It differs from it
in three respects by eliminating (1) the requirement that the supervisor must have
five employees in his charge, (2) the exemption with respect to supervisors covered
by collective agreement in 1935, and (3) timekeepers and inspectors, thereby leav-
ing them under the act. It will be noted, however, that this amendment does not
mean that employers cannot still bargain with such supervisors and include them,
if they see fit, in collective-bargaining contracts. All that the proposal does is to
prevent employers being compelled to accord supervisors the anomalous status of
employees for purposes of the Wagner Act.
Id. at 19.
69. H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). See note 53 supra.
70. The conference agreement, in the definition of "supervisor," limits such term
to those individuals treated as supervisors under the Senate amendment. In the case
of persons working in the labor relations, personnel and employment departments,
it was not thought necessary to make specific provisions, as was done in the House
bill, since the Board has treated, and presumably will continue to treat, such persons
as outside the scope of the Act. This is the prevailing Board practice with respect
to such people as confidential secretaries as well, and it was not the intention of
the conferees to alter this practice in any respect.
H. CONF. R P. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947) (emphasis added). See also
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 282 (1974).
1975]
104 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9
Report stated.71 If the limited Senate definition of supervisor was the
only one to be applied, it is not clear whether the rest of the language of
the Report, regarding the Board's prior treatment of those in labor
relations, was intended as strict congressional mandate or as mere
rhetorical salve to make the political realities of the Senate's restricted
position more palatable to the House, in order to speed passage."
B. The Board's View
Following enactment of the amendment, the Board's task of deter-
mining units was less discretionary, but nonetheless difficult. Questions
involving supervisors, professional employees, guards and most of the
other classifications which had caused so many problems for the Board
as matters of policy had been resolved by Congress. Now the principle
policy basis on which the Board would exclude employees from particu-
lar units was that of "lack of community of interest."' 73 Confidential and
managerial employees continued to be excluded from units of other
employees as a matter of policy.74 While the Board specifically re-
affirmed the limited definitions of confidential and managerial employ-
ees that it had set forth in Ford Motor," it used the terms to describe a
broad spectrum of employees whose interests were aligned with manage-
ment: relatives of management;76 representatives of management; 77 top
level executives who, like those in Ford Motor, "formulate, determine
71. Id. See also note 50 supra and accompanying text.
72. The Senate's position was more moderate and generally better reasoned. The
House had to accept this position to ensure passage over the certain presidential veto. See
MILLis & BROWN, supra note 64, at 363-92. See also note 53 supra,
73. 13 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 36 (1948).
74. Id. at 40.
75. 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946). See notes 36 & 37 supra and accompanying text.
76. Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1343, 1345 (1954) (dissenting
opinion); Niagara Beer Distribs. Ass'n, 108 N.L.R.B. 1571 (1954); Olden Camera &
Lens Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 35 (1954); Alloy Mfg. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1201 (1954); Page
Boy Co., Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 126 (1953); Bogalusa Motors, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 97
(1953); International Metal Prods. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 65 (1953); Inyo Lumber Co., 92
N.L.R.B. 1267, 1270 n.5 (1951); Broadway Iron & Pipe, 83 N.L.R.B. 942 (1949);
Associated Electronic Enterprises, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 295 (1948); Superior Bakery, 78
N.L.R.B. 1172 (1948); Preferred Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 770 (1948); George Ehlenberger
& Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 701 (1948); Kol-Master Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 466 (1948).
77. Fresno Auto Auction, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 878 (1967); ACF Indus., Inc., 145
N.L.R.B. 403 (1963); Armour & Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 122 (1957); Gulf States Tel. Co.,
118 N.L.R.B. 1039, 1041 (1957); General Tel. Co. of Ohio, 112 N.L.R.B. 1225, 1229
(1955); New England Tel. & Tel., 90 N.L.R.B. 639, 644 (1950); Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 549, 555 (1948); Continental Can Co., Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 351, 354
(1947).
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and effectuate management policies;" 8 buyers and purchasing agents
and others who could commit the employer's credit;79 and those whose
interests were found to be more closely related or aligned with manage-
ment than with the interests of the unit employees.8 0
While the Board, as a matter of policy, uniformly excluded employees
whom it classified as managerial or confidential from collective bargain-
ing units, only rarely did it go so far as to imply that managerials were
not employees at all within the meaning of the Act under section
2(3).81 In one decision, Swift & Co., 2 the Board specifically held that
78. Grocers Supply Co., Inc. 160 N.L.R.B. 485, 491 (1966); Garden Island Publishing
Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 697, 701-02 (1965); Central Maine Power Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 42
(1965); Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 569 (1963); Textile Workers
Union, 138 N.L.R.B. 269 n.2 (1962); International Ladies' Garment Workers Union,
131 N.L.R.B. 111, 112 n.2 (1961); Kitsap County Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 124 N.L.R.B.
933 (1959); Norman Weaver, 123 N.L.R.B. 209, 215 (1959); AFL-CIO, 120 N.L.R.B.
969 (1958); Albert Lea Cooperative Creamery Ass'n, 119 N.L.R.B. 817, 822-23
(1957); Copeland Refrig. Corp., 118 N.L.R.B. 1364 (1957); Air Line Pilots Ass'n,
97 N.L.R.B. 929, 931 (1951); General Elec. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 726, 732 (1950);
Worthington Pump & Mach. Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 678 (1947).
79. Grocers Supply Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 485, 488 (1966); Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen & Enginemen, 145 N.L.R.B. 1521, 1536 (1964); ACF Indus., Inc., 145
N.L.R.B. 403, 405 (1963); Overton Markets, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 615, 621 (1963); Root
Dry Goods Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 953, 955 n.7 (1960); W.W. Chambers Co., 124 N.L.R.B.
984, 988 (1959); Norman Weaver, 123 N.L.R.B. 209, 216 (1959); Temco Aircraft
Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1085, 1089 (1958); Kearney & Treker Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 817,
822 (1958); Federal Tel. & Radio Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1652, 1653-54 (1958); Copeland
Refrig. Corp., 118 N.L.R.B. 1364 (1957); Diana Shop, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 743,
745 (1957); Mack Trucks, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 1576 (1956); Plankinton Packing Co., 116
N.LR.B. 1225, 1227-28 (1956); Clements Auto Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 968, 970 (1956);
Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956); Girdler Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 726, 729 (1956);
Parrot Packing Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1432 (1955); Eljer Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1417 (1954);
Fair Dep't Store, 107 N.L.R.B. 1501, 1502 (1954); Curtiss-Wright Corp., 103 N.L.R.B.
458, 464 (1953); Titeflex, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 223, 225 (1953); Florence Stove Co., 98
N.L.R.B. 16 (1952); East Coast Fisheries, Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 1261 (1952); Federal
Telecommunications Laboratories, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1395, 1399 (1951); American
Locomotive Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 115, 116 (1950); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 8
(1950); Wise, Smith & Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 1019, 1021 (1949); Robinson-Schwenn Store,
83 N.L.R.B. 35, 37 (1949).
80. Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 1168 (1969); Bank of America, 174
N.L.R.B. 298, 301 (1969); Allied Super Mkts., Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 361, 362 (1967); Ed's
Foodland, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1256, 1260-61 (1966); Garden Island Publishing Co., 154
N.L.R.B. 697, 701 (1965); R. L. Polk & Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1959); Sunnyland
Packing Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 162, 165-66 (1955); American Broadcasting Co., 107
N.L.R.B. 74 (1953); Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1411, 1415 (1951);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 8 (1950); Transit Cas. Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 857
(1949); Denton's, Inc., 83 N.L.R.B. 35 (1949); Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp.,
75 N.L.R.B. 320 (1947); Denver Dry Goods Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1167 (1947).
81. See note 56 supra.
82. Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956). Swift was the single most troublesome
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managerials were not entitled to any of the protections of the Act.
In Swift, the petitioner sought to represent a unit of production and
maintenance employees including the procurement drivers, or in the
alternative, a separate unit of the drivers. The employer contended that
the inclusion of a separate unit of the drivers was inappropriate because
they lacked a community of interest with the production employees.88
The issue, then, in its origin, was not whether the drivers were manage-
rial employees, but rather, whether they shared a sufficient community
of interest with the other employees so as to be included in the same
unit.
The drivers purchased poultry and eggs from sundry independent
suppliers. As part of their duties, they were constantly trying to find new
sources of supply. In ferretting out new business, they had the power to
raise the price in order to overcome competition and insure a steady
supply to the plant. The Board determined that in so doing, they
exercised independent judgment, and therefore, their community of
interest was different from that of the other employees. In so holding it
upheld the position of the employer who likewise urged exclusion based
on a lack of community of interest only:
The fundamental duty of the procurement drivers in this case is to make
purchases of produce for the Employer. In so doing they exercise a
managerial prerogative. Accordingly, we find that the interests of the
procurement drivers are allied with management and exclude them from
the production and maintenance unit herein found appropriate.
8 4
Had the Board limited its holding at this point, the exclusion might still
have been limited to one based upon community of interest. Not content
to leave the exclusion so limited, however, the Board noted:
It was the clear intent of Congress to exclude from the coverage of the
Act all individuals allied with management. Such individuals cannot be
deemed to be employees for the purposes of the Act.8 5
Whether this statement was intended or merely a poor choice of lan-
guage, the result was that managerial employees were not "employees"
precedent for the Board during the circuit litigation leading up to the Bell decision. The
Board finally overruled it but too late. See notes 94, 99 'A 100 infra and accompanying
text. Note that since that time the Board's language is more carefully chosen when
dealing with a unit of confidential employees. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
The Board will only go so far as to say that confidential employees cannot be certified in
a separate or any other unit. This time the circuits will have to eliminate them as
employees altogether. But see note 122 infra.
83. 115 N.L.R.B. at 752.
84. Id. at 753. But see text accompanying notes 164-68 infra.
85. Id. at 753-54 (emphasis added & footnotes omitted).
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within the meaning of section 2(3) of the Act, thus shifting -the basis
for the exclusion from one of policy to that of one mandated by stat-
ute. 6 In so doing the Board left little doubt what its position was with
respect to at least those managerial employees who could commit the
employer's credit. The Board fashioned for itself a precedent which it
would later regret.87
C. The Circuit Courts' Views
The circuit courts8 8 generally followed the Board's policy of exclud-
ing managerial employees from bargaining units of rank and file em-
ployees, but only in dicta did they go so far as to deny them all
protection under the Act.89
The Business Agents are not "Managerial Employees." Although the
Act makes no special provision for "managerial employees," under a
'Board policy of long duration, this category of personnel has been ex-
cluded from the protection of the Act.90
The District of Columbia Circuit in Retail Clerks International Asso-
ciation v. NLRB, 9' fashioned a two-way test to determine managerial
86. See note 56 supra.
87. See notes 94, 99 & 100 infra and accompanying text.
88. Generally the Board seeks enforcement of its final orders in the circuit court
having jurisdiction over the parties as provided in section 10(e) of the Act. It should
be noted that determinations made by the Board under its discretion in section 9 as to the
appropriateness of any unit are not directly reviewable. Instead, the party seeking review
of the unit determination must refuse to bargain and the Board will take the matter to
the circuit for enforcement as an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(5) or
8(b)(3), where the party will be bound by the evidence adduced in the section 9
proceeding in attacking the appropriateness of the unit. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 162 (1941); 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.67(f), 102.69(c) (1974).
89. See, e.g., International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 116
(2d Cir. 1964).
90. Id. at 123. The Board is required to take jurisdiction over labor organizations
acting as employers. Office Employees Int'l Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957).
Ironically, many of the early circuit decisions involved the bizarre turn of events where
labor organizations themselves, cast in the role of employers, tried to block the
organization of their own staffs of representatives, business agents, and organizers, by
relying on the managerial exclusions. They were largely unsuccessful because in these
cases the Board placed little significance on the fact that the employees in question could
commit the credit of the employer, a factor of paramount importance in the earlier Swift
decision. See, e.g., Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1017 (1967). In American Fed'n of Labor, 120 N.L.R.B. 969
(1958), the Board rejected arguments that the business agents could commit the
employer's credit, worked without supervision, represented the employer to the public,
and could bargain and sign agreements for the employer; holding that those indicia alone
were not sufficient to exclude them as managerial employees, and stressing that they did
not establish policy, but followed it.
91. 366 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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status: The position was managerial if (1) the position with the em-
ployer presented a potential conflict of interest between the employer
and the workers, or (2) the workers were those who formulate,
determine, and effectuate an employer's policies and have independent
discretion in the performance of their job.91 This approach was followed
in the Seventh Circuit.9
At no time, however, had either the Board or the courts been forced
to face the question squarely of whether or not those excluded from
bargaining units as a matter of policy still were entitled to protection
under other sections of the Act.
IV. FACING THE DILEMMA: IS A "MANAGERIAL" AN EMPLOYEE
WITHIN THE AcT?
A. The Board's Approach
The Board reluctantly confronted this dilemma in a series of cases
entitled North Arkansas Electrical Cooperative, Inc.' " Under considera-
tion was an employee classified as an "electrification advisor" who had
been discharged for not remaining neutral in an election campaign. Both
the trial examiner95 at the administrative hearing and the Board in its
review of the matter, decided that the employee in question was not
managerial and that the employer had violated section 8(a)(3) of the
Act by discharging him and ordered the employee reinstated with back
pay.96 The Eighth Circuit denied enforcement and held that the em-
ployee in question was managerial. It left to the Board on remand,
however, the critical question of whether or not the discharge of a man-
agerial employee was a violation of the Act; that is, whether a mana-
gerial employee was protected by the Act.98
92. Id. at 644-45 (employee not required to meet both tests).
93. Westinghouse v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
831 (1970); Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc., v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1969).
94. North Ark. Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 921 (1967), rev'd, 412 F.2d 324
(8th Cir. 1969); North Arkansas Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550, 551 (1970),
enforcement denied, 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971).
95. "The title of 'Trial Examiner' was changed to 'Administrative Law Judge' effective
August 19, 1972." Mademoiselle Shoppe, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 983 n.1 (1972); 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.6 (1974).
96. North Ark. Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 921 (1967). Interestingly,
no Board determination had been made prior to this as to whether or not electrification
advisors were to be included in the unit. The employer contended, off the record, that
such employees should be excluded as managerial employees and apparently the union
agreed. The employee in question did not vote. Id. at 922 n.2.




On remand, the Board seemed to define anew the elusive "managerial
employee," with a three-fold test embodying elements of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court test:
[1] [T]here is nothing in the record to suggest that he participated in
the formulation, determination, or effectuation of policy with respect to
employee relations matters. [2] Nor is there any indication that his
status in the Cooperative's organization was such as to lead any em-
ployee reasonably to believe that Lenox had substantial responsibilities
in this area so that views which he might express would be taken as
a reflection of the considered position of the Cooperative. [3] Finally,
insofar as we can determine there is nothing in this record to suggest
an inconsistency or conflict of interest between Lenox's proper perform-
ance of his job and the concerted activity.99
It held that those such as managerial and confidential employees ex-
cluded from units as a matter of Board policy because of their lack of
community of interest under section 9, were nonetheless employees
within the meaning of section 2(3) and therefore entitled to protection
from unfair labor practices under section 8. It overruled Swift to the
extent that it was contrary, implying that anyone not specifically ex-
cluded as an employee in section 2(3) of the Act could not be denied
the protection of the Act. 10
B. The Circuit Courts' Response
While the North Arkansas cases were progressing, a parallel develop-
ment in the Second Circuit added to the complexity. The Board had
determined that a unit of buyers at Bell Aerospace, whether or not one
consisting of managerial employees, constituted a unit appropriate for
purposes of collective bargaining,' and later certified United Auto
Workers Local 1286 as the agent for collective bargaining, after it had
obtained a majority of the valid votes cast at the election. 10 2
On the same day that the certification was issued, the Eighth Circuit
again denied enforcement of the Board's second North Arkansas order,
holding that managerial employees were not "employees" within the
meaning of section 2(3) of the Act.0 3 With this, Bell sought
reconsideration from the Board of its decision. The Board denied the
99. 185 N.L.R.B. 550, 551 (1970) (emphasis in original; numerals supplied).
100. Id. at 551 n.8.
101. Bell Aerospace Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 431 (1971).
102. The decision is unpublished but is contained in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at
66-68, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
103. NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971).
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motion, stating its disagreement with the Eighth Circuit.1 04 Bell then
refused to bargain with the newly certified unit's representative and
when the Board sought enforcement of an order 10 5 in the Second Circuit
to compel bargaining, enforcement was denied.10 6 The Second Circuit
not only agreed with the Eighth Circuit that managerial employees were
not employees within the meaning of section 2(3) of the Act,10 7 but
held that the Board had erred in changing its policy without resorting to
"rule-making" as provided for in the Administrative Procedure Act.10 1
The Supreme Court granted review to settle the issue.109
V. TiE SuPRn M COURT DECISION
A. The Majority View
A unanimous Court held that the Board could proceed with a case by
case ad hoc adjudication rather than via rule making as had been so
frequently urged by commentators and critics."10 It divided, however,
five to four on the issue of managerial employees, holding that they were
not employees within the meaning of the Act."'
104. Bell Aerospace Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 827 (1972).
105. Bell Aerospace Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 209 (1972). See also note 88 supra.
106. Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485 (2nd Cir. 1973).
107. Id. at 494.
108. Id. at 495; 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1958). The procedures outlined in section 553 call
generally for notice of and opportunity to be heard on proposed rules. Cf. NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1967). See generally 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATI
L W TRATiSE §§ 6.01-6.10 (1958).
109. Certiorari was granted at 414 U.S. 816 (1973). For discussion of the recent
circuit developments see Watson, The Exclusion of "Managerial" Personnel from Collec-
tive Bargaining Units, 49 L.A.B. BuLL. 53-61 (1973) and 26 VAND. L. REv. 850
(1973).
110. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290 (1974). Three parties filing
briefs urged the Court to adopt the ad hoc adjudication approach. See Brief for
Petitioner, Brief for the United States Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae, and
Brief for the United Auto Workers as Amicus Curiae, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267 (1974). For critical views before and since see: Bernstein, The NLRB's
Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE
LI. 571 (1970); Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking
Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A.L. R1v. 63 (1973); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-
Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE LJ. 729 (1961);
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Admin-
istrative Policy, 78 HAnv. L. RFv. 921 (1965); The Case for the National Labor
Relations Board's Use of Rulemaking in Asserting Jurisdiction, 25 LAB. L.J 607 (1974).
For a cavalier statement that adjudication is preferable to lawyers see Reflections of
Chairman Miller, BNA News and Background Information, 87 LAB. REL. REP. 348, 349
(1974).
111. 416 U.S. at 289-90.
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The majority generally followed the rationale of the Second and
Eighth Circuits in arriving at its conclusion that managerial employees
were not entitled to the protection of the Act. In its interpretation of the
pre-Taft-Hartley Board decisions involving managerial employees, for
example, the majority viewed the Board's policy of excluding manageri-
als as closely related to the exclusion of supervisors." 2 In fact, however,
almost all exclusions prior to Taft-Hartley (including those of supervi-
sors) were based on the lack of community of interest between the
excluded class and those in the unit sought. 113 The majority made much
of the checkered judicial history of supervisors prior to Taft-Hartley and
gave great weight to the legislative history of that Act in arriving at its
conclusion that Congress intended to exclude supervisors and therefore,
managerial employees." 4
While the Court's review of the legislative history is fundamentally
accurate, its conclusions are in many ways disquieting. Having estab-
lished congressional interpretation of prevailing Board policy as a model
for construction," 5 the Court first acknowledged that Congress was
mistaken as to prevailing Board policy in 1947,11 and then assumed
that even though Congress did not say anything specific about "manage-
rial employees," such employees must have been nonetheless included in
an undefined class of "impliedly excluded" employees since the specific
112. More significantly, the majority itself becomes enmeshed in the forty years of
confusion in the use of the terms managerial, supervisory, and confidential, and fails
itself to properly define or distinguish among them. Prior to excluding managerial
employees as an implicit function of the "congressional will," the majority properly
observed that the House report construed the Board interpretation of confidential
employee as including most executives. The majority felt that such an interpretation was
probably broader than the recent Board policy, but that the clear intent of Congress was
to exclude confidential employees under the broader definition. But the majority com-
pletely misconstrued the definition of confidential employee posited by the Ford Motor
decision. According to the majority, the Board limited confidential employees to "those
who exercised 'managerial' functions in the field of labor relations." Id. at 283-84 n.12.
The actual Ford holding was much narrower:
It is our intention to limit the term "confidential" so as to embrace only those
employees who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who exercise
"managerial" functions in the field of labor relations.
66 N.L.R.B. at 1322 (emphasis added).
Thus the definition of confidential employee was much narrower than the Bell
majority thought and those in a "managerial" status did appear to be limited under Ford
to those involved with policy matters in the labor relations area.
113. See 416 U.S. at 299 (White, J., dissenting); 13 NLRB ANN. REP. 36 (1948); cf.
Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956).
114. 416 U.S. at 277-84.
115. Id. at 274-75.
116. Id. at 283-84 n.12.
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exclusions in the Act "assuredly . . . did not exhaust the universe of
such excluded persons."" 7 It then granted managerial employees admis-
sion into this open-ended category. "We think the inference is plain that
'managerial employees' were paramount among this impliedly excluded
group." 5) The fact that supervisors were expressly excluded while
managerials were not mentioned should suggest the opposite result:
managerials were intended to be included within the purview of the Act.
In the final analysis, the Court's conclusion is sound as it appears to
approve a narrow definition of "managerial" which would almost re-
quire a finding of supervisory status in any case thereby merging the two
into one exclusion." 9 It is the Court's reasoning, or rather its adoption
of that of the Second and Eighth Circuits, which is the principal flaw of
the decision. The majority opinion assumed that one is an employee only
if included in a unit pursuant to section 9, and ignored the fact that
section 2(3) confers employee status.'20 Thus the Court emphasized
that the Board in its entire history had never certified a separate unit of
"managerial employees," and, therefore, concluded that such employees
had no standing under the Act. 2' In order, then, to have the protection
of the Act, one must either be included within a unit of employees at a
given plant, or at least have the realistic potential of being assimilated
into a separate but appropriate unit. 22 The effect, of course, would be
117. Id. at 283.
118. Id. at 283-84.
119. The Court speaks repeatedly of "executives" in its discussion of "managerial
employees." Id. at 284 n.13, 289 n.18. Though in the latter the court draws a line
between executives and section 2(11) supervisors, it is not clear how anyone so highly
placed could not be a supervisor. It is more probable that such non-supervisory executives
would be professional employees. For recent Board discussion of the distinctions see
Lockheed-California Co., 217 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 89 L.R.R.M. 1289 (Apr. 29, 1975);
Flintkote Co., 217 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 89 L.R.R.M. 1295 (Apr. 22, 1975); General
Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 87 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1974).
120. 416 U.S. at 287-88; 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 159 (1970). See notes 5 & 56 supra.
121. 416 U.S. at 287-88.
122. Though the Bell decision does not mention it, both the Second and Eighth
Circuits relied substantially on the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in NLRB v. Wheeling
Elec. Co., 444 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1971). In that case, a confidential secretary, as defined
by the Board, was fired for honoring a picket line. The reasoning of the Wheeling Court
is instructive:
It strikes us as nonsense for the Board to exclude Mrs. McConnell from member-
ship in the bargaining unit and then extend to her the same protection for the same
concerted activity that she would have enjoyed if a union member. If Mrs. McCon-
nell is committed to the union cause to the extent she joins the strike by refusing
to cross the picket line, it would seem to matter little to the company that she is
not technically a union member. A confidential secretary who plights her troth
with the union differs in form, but not in substance, from one who holds a union
card. Since she cannot formally join the unit, there is nothing incongruous in hold-
ing that she cannot "plight her troth" with the unit. Indeed, it seems more incon-
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to leave countless numbers of employees uncertain of the Board's pro-
tection until a determination is made as to their status; also, it could
leave statutory employees who are alone and excluded from the bargain-
ing unit stripped of all protection.1 23 This decision also leaves unsettled
the status of employees relegated to separate units by statute.12 4 Finally,
the Bell majority failed to provide any guidance as to how the Board and
sistent to say that if she cannot act in concert by participating in the unit, then
she cannot act in concert on an informal basis, or more accurately, that if she does
so, it will be without the protection of the Act. Management is entitled to security
of its confidential information and may insist upon the loyalty of those employees
who have access to it. For this reason, confidential employees cannot be granted
the protection afforded ordinary employees under the Act. Like supervisors, "such
loyalty cannot be secured if [they] are psychologically allied with, or subject to the
pressures of, their union on behalf of the rank and file."
Id. at 788 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
Although the Fourth Circuit fails to make any distinction between protected concerted
activity on the one hand and union activity on the other, it does not appear to feel
obligated to do so in view of its original finding that any employees consistently excluded
by the Board and denied bargaining rights in a unit are not section 2(3) employees, and
thus do not have any protection. This view, though not adopted by the Fifth Circuit
(NLRB v. Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299, 1301 (5th Cir. 1970)) has been approved
in the Seventh (Peerless, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir. 1973)). The
latter defines confidential employees as section 2(11) supervisors.
123. The Board will not certify a unit consisting of one employee. Sonoma-Marin
Publishing Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 625 (1968); Griffin Wheel Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1471 (1948).
124. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1970) and note 58 supra. Consider, as an illustration,
the status of a guard who is fired for attending a union meeting for rank and file em-
ployees. Section 9(b) (3) of the Act clearly establishes that guards are employees within
the meaning of section 2(3) of the Act. Yet by virtue of section 9(b)(3), the union
which he is supporting cannot be certified to represent him since it also represents non-
guards. Of what practical value then are his rights to assist such a labor organization?
True, the employer might voluntarily recognize a hypothetical unit without being re-
quired to do so under the statute, but is the situation different from that when an em-
ployer fires a supervisor for joining a union which the employer might also recognize
voluntarily but to which he owes no such obligation under the Act? Under the rationale
of Bell, the guard, at least in this case, is not an "employee."
In just such a case, the Fourth Circuit had a difficult time reconciling its decision to
enforce the Board's order of reinstatement of this statutory employee with the sweeping
pronouncement it had made earlier in refusing to do so in Wheeling. See NLRB v. Bel-
Air Mart, Inc., 497 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1974). Thus, whereas it had earlier seemed
eager to deny the protection of the Act to employees which Congress had not specifically
excluded from the Act, the Fourth Circuit seems less eager to exclude those clothed with
specific congressional "employee" status, despite its own inconsistency of reasoning.
In view of such developments, the Board recently denied certification to a unit of
employees it classified as "confidential," but it did not say that such employees had no
protection under the Act. The language is of interest:
We therefore conclude, based on evidence regarding the access to and nature of
information shared by all employees in the proposed unit, that these employees are
"confidential" and should be excluded from participation in a representation elec-
tion under the Act.
Pullman Standard Div. of Pullman, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip 5, 87 L.R.R.M.
1370, 1371 (1974).
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the courts should distinguish between managerial and professional em-
ployees. Such a distinction is needed because Congress expressly gave to
professional employees specific "employee" status under the Act.'2 In a
passing footnote, the majority asserted in purely conclusory language
that "'professional employees,' however, are plainly not the same thing
as 'managerial employees.' ",126 If this proposition is correct, it remains to
be seen how the Board and the courts will show that attorneys, account-
ants, engineers, nurses, and doctors do not "formulate, determine and
effectuate management policies.' 27
B. The Minority View
Speaking for the dissenting four Justices, Justice White stressed the
plain meaning of the statute. He noted first that section 2(3) granted
the Board's protection to "any employee,"' 28 and second, that the
specific exclusions for supervisors were narrowly drawn in section
2(11).129 He did not shrink from highlighting the "professional employ-
ee"--"managerial employee" dilemma that the majority had sired.""0
Reviewing the history of the problem, the dissent found that the
Board's past exclusion of managerial employees was based upon the
community of interest theory.'' While admitting to the uneven course
which the Board had charted with respect to supervisors, the dissent
emphasized that at no time during this period of vacillation did the
Board hold that supervisors were not entitled to the protections of the
Act.' 32 The inconsistency of permitting the protections of the Act to be
accorded to professionals but not to managerials was thus crystallized in
the dissent, if not in the majority.
Consistent with its narrow interpretations of the statute, the dissent
adhered to a stricter interpretation of the legislative history as well.
Thus, for it the significance of the Conference Committee report was the
absence of any need to amend the report to exclude managerials,
because the Board had always excluded labor relations and confidential
employees without feeling the need to group them together under the
125. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1970).
126. 416 U.S. at 283-85 n.13.
127. See note 144 infra and accompanying text.
128. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970) and note 56 supra.
129. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970) and note 57 supra.
130. 416 U.S. at 297-98.
131. Id. at 299.
132. Id. at 300.
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"managerial" heading.' 3 3 The majority's analysis of congressional intent
first came under fire with regard to the congressional view of "confi-
dential" executives. White stressed that the application of congressional
interpretation will always require a finding of supervisory indicia within
section 2(11). To define confidential employees by the application of
supervisory indicia would create an unnecessary step of analysis because
the Act specifically excluded supervisors. 34 Thus it was unnecessary to
determine whether or not employees were confidential since they would
be excluded if they fit the supervisory indicia.
The logic of the minority's position is less certain, however, in the
wake of its rush to approve the limited "labor relations touchstone" test
upon which the Board had come to rely so recently.' 35 Noting that such
a narrow exclusion is more consistent with the Packard Co. v. Labor
Board dissent,3 6 which concerned itself principally with those formu-
lating labor policies, the minority appeared to agree that the exclusion
of such employees, at least as managerial employees, is consistent with
congressional intent. 3 7 The four dissenting Justices appear to have mis-
interpreted the reach of the majority's position. The majority had dis-
creetly left to the Board on remand the application of the managerial
question to the facts at hand. 38
In its enthusiasm to embrace the Board's community-of-interest ra-
tionalization explaining the forty-year history of managerial exclusions,
the minority conveniently passed over the American Locomotive Co.
3 9
and Swift140 decisions as mere ancient anomalies which the Board in its
discretion was wholly entitled to overrule. 4 '
With respect to the majority's contention that the 1959 congressional
133. Id. at 303-04.
134. Id. at 307 n.3.
135. Id. at 303-05. Especially noteworthy is the argument of the dissent that Congress
intended to narrowly define any exclusions from the Act. Notice the status of some of
the other employees which the House originally had intended to exclude, such as time-
study personnel and guards, but to which Congress ultimately accorded the protection
of the Act. Id. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
136. 330 U.S. 485, 493 (1947).
137. The minority notes that the conference committee exclusion of those involved
with labor relations is a much narrower class of employees than those whom the Board
had come to exclude under the managerial label. 416 U.S. at 303-04.
138. 416 U.S. at 289-90 & nn.19-20.
139. 92 N.L.R.B. 115, 116-17 (1950) (buyers not included in unit or permitted in
unit of their own). The majority opinion cited the case as more proof of managerial
exclusion by the Board. 416 U.S. at 286-87.
140. See note 82 supra.
141. 416 U.S. at 309-10.
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silence in amending the Act is tantamount to approving Swift, 142 the
dissent noted that the main purpose of the Landrum-Griffin amend-
ments was to extend protection against secondary boycotts. 148 Although
the amendment did not deal with employee classifications at length, the
debates did contain substantial discussion regarding revisions of the
definition and classification of supervisors.
VI. THE NEW MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES
-Not surprisingly, since Bell, the Board has restricted the concept and
use of the term "managerial" to high level executives whose status would
qualify them to be supervisors within the meaning of section 2(11).
This it has done with admirable consistency, but not without dissent and
confusion among the members. 4 ' The definition of managerial employ-
ee was set forth in a Board decision soon after Bell as follows:
142. 416 U.S. at 287-88. The 1959 amendments were part of the so-called Landrum-
Gi-iffin Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 153, 158-60, 164, 187 (1970). See LEaIstAnvE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOsuRE Acr OF 1959 (1959).
143. 416 U.S. at 310. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ]LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORT-
ING ND DIsCLOsURE ACT OF 1959 (1959). Amendments were introduced to include com-
munications assistants in the telephone industry as supervisors. Id. at 429-30, 452, 453,
580-81, 1048-49, 1065-66, 1071, 1262, 1273, 1290. The House amendment contained no
such provision, id. at 1361, and the amendment was dropped in conference. Id. at
1383. The original Kennedy-Ervin bill attempted to restrict the definition of supervisor
from "authority ... responsibly to direct employees . . ." to "one ... whose
principal function is responsibly to direct other employees." Id. at 986. A final
irony: a bill was introduced in the House to restore protection under the Act to foremen
to "[free them from] the shackles that bind the foremen of America in managerial
bondage .. . " Id. at 1466 (emphasis added).
144. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, Archdiocesan High Schools,
216 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 88 L.R.R.M. 1169 (Jan. 21, 1975) (business managers excluded
as partly managerial, partly supervisory); Golden West Broadcasters-KTLA, 215
N.L.R.B. No. 141, 88 L.R.R.M. 1053 (1974); Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., WBZ-TV,
WJZ-TV, 215 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 88 L.R.R.M. 1012 (1974) (staff directors not manageri-
al); Diamond Motors, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 119, 87 L.R.R.M. 1014 (1974) (auto parts
man who can commit credit up to $3,000 routinely, not managerial); Shayne Bros., Inc.,
213 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 87 L.R.R.M. 1080 (1974) (swingmen not managerial employees).
Clearly the most revealing decision to date is General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B.
No. 124, 87 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1974). With over 1600 employees in approximately 85
highly technical classifications, the Board walked a rhetorical tightrope in distinguishing
between managerial employees and professional employees. Samples of the language are
instructive:
Work which is based on professional competence necessarily involves a consistent
exercise of discretion and judgment, else professionalism would not be involved.
Nevertheless, professional employees are clearly not the same as management em-
ployees either by definition or in authority, and managerial authority is not vested
in professional employees merely by virtue of their professional status, or because
work performed in that status may have a bearing on company direction. Likewise,
technical expertise in administrative functions which may involve the exercise of
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The 'Board has generally sought to exclude from employee units those
employees who, while not supervisory, were so closely allied or identified
with management that their interests warranted exclusion from the pro-
tection of the Act. Those employees who formulate, determine, and ef-
fectuate an employer's policies, and who exhibit sufficient discretion in
the performance of their duties to indicate that they are not merely fol-
lowing established employer policy have been held by the Board to be
managerial employees.-1 5
And unlike the term "supervisor," which has consistently been inter-
preted to apply in the disjunctive,'46 the new definition has only been
applied conjunctively; that is, a finding of all of the elements combined,
not merely one, is required.'47
judgment and discretion does not confer executive-type status upon the performer.
A lawyer or a certified public accountant working for, or retained by, a company
may well cause change in the company direction, or even policy, based on his pro-
fessional advice alone which, by itself, would not make him managerial.
Id. at 22, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1715.
In language reminiscent of Justice Douglas' Packard dissent, but here used for a dif-
ferent purpose, the Board noted:
We do not believe that the employees who exercise these job responsibilities are true
representatives of management in the traditional sense, or that Congress intended
that managerial status be conferred upon or extend to such employees. Conferring
such status upon them would eviscerate the traditional distinction between labor and
management.
Id. at 24, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1716. Then in marked contrast to the potentially infinite class
of employees which the majority in Bell felt Congress had "impliedly excluded," the
Board proceeded to narrow the class of employees who will thus be excluded from the
Act by creating an equally fictitious class of employees upon whom Congress did not
intend that managerial status be conferred. It is difficult to determine to what extent
the following language was used deliberately, but some of the implications seem too clear
for mere coincidence:
It is basically for these reasons that we find that the aforesaid job responsibilities
do not embrace the type of supervisorial authority essential for unit exclusion.
Supervisors are management people. Their functions are aligned with managerial
authority rather than with work performance of a routine, technical, or consultative
nature. While it is true that the authorities contained in Section 2(11) of the Act
are indicative of supervisorial authority, it does not necessarily follow that the exer-
cise of one or more of those authorities ipso facto confers supervisorial authority
unless it is exercised in the genuine managerial sense.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Lockheed-California Co., 217 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 89
L.R.R.M. 1289 (Apr. 29, 1975); Flintkote Co., 217 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 89 L.R.R.M. 1295
(Apr. 22, 1975). If all supervisors are management people, would it follow that all
managerials are supervisors? Will the Board complete the truism? Is the classification of
new managerial employees being carved out by the Board so narrow as to include only
those who also fall within the congressionally approved supervisory exclusions under
section 2(11)?
145. Shayne Bros., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 87 L.R.R.M. 1080 (1974), quoting AFL-
CIO, 120 N.L.R.B. 969 (1958).
146. Golden West Broadcasters-KTLA, 215 NLRB No. 141, at slip 11 n.11, 88
L.R.R.M. 1053, 1055 n.11 (1974) (Member Kennedy dissenting). See also National
Welders Supply Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 514 (1960).
147. Shayne Bros., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 87 L.R.R.M. 1080 (1974).
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Yet, as in the cases before Bell, the circuits will be the final arbiters of
the question of who is a managerial employee. Even though the Board
enjoys broad discretion in its determinations of such status,14 8 confusion
over the use of the terms, especially in the area of media employers, has
already produced a conflict among the circuits. 4 9
VII. THE EFFECTS OF BELL
If the recently developed and much narrower Board definition of
"managerial" withstands the scrutiny of the courts, the Bell decision will
sink into obscurity. If not, only a congressional remedy will settle the
status of a new class of employees that grows each day with the advance
of American technocracy. 50 Consider, for example, the following hypo-
thetical:
Noah Count, employed as a buyer and office assistant at Ready Office
Supply, gathers together some disgruntled office employees at Ready
and suggests that a union is the solution to their many problems. As a
former member of Local 123 of the Association of Blue Collar Workers,
Count goes down to the union hall and gets some authorization cards.
The next day at lunch he has most of the office people and inside sales
people at Ready sign the cards in his presence. He returns them to the
Association, which then files a petition with the Board. Count has none
of the indicia of a section 2(11) supervisor, but he can pledge the
Employer's credit when he makes purchases in amounts up to $5000,
provided he follows established procurement guidelines.
The day after the petition arrives at the store, Count is called into the
office by the district sales manager and the store manager and is asked if
he knows anything about the petition, and which employees signed
cards. They then tell him that he will lose his job when the petition
148. Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Engrs., 382 U.S. 181 (1965); NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
149. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 1055 (2nd Cir. 1974) (per
curiam), enforcing 203 N.L.R.B. No. 91 (1973) (television staff producers held non-
managerial); Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 52 (10th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974) (editorial writers held non-employees). The
decision used the term "confidential" broadly and added a first amendment dimension by
providing the media with a constitutional shield against unionization.
150. Professional employees represented 14.3 percent of the total labor force in 1972.
J.S. CENsus BUREAU, STATISTlCAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNmTED STATES 320 (1972). See
Brief for the United Auto Workers as Amicus Curiae at 21, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). Membership by professional and public employees in associa-




reaches the main office. At the same time, they brief the next senior
employee and Count's fellow organizer about coming events. Two days
later, Count is discharged for "failing to properly manage," and a
former co-organizer is promoted to Operations Manager.
The employer demands a representation hearing and Count files
charges against the employer alleging violations of section 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act.151 What result?
Clearly Count is not a supervisor as defined in section 2(1 1).152 In
fact, the only quality that he possesses which vaguely resembles that of a
managerial employee is his ability to pledge the employer's credit by his
signature in a totally non-discretionary fashion in amounts not exceed-
ing $5,000.'13 If he is a managerial employee, under Bell his discharge
for union activities, which the other employees clearly associate with him
as the principal organizer, will not have been a violation of the Act, and
Count goes without remedy since he is not an employee. 154 If under Bell
managerial employees are also section 2(2)155 employers and section
2(11)156 supervisors, then another probable result is that the organiza-
tional effort will be abruptly halted when the petition is dismissed with
prejudice because of the tainted showing of interest caused when a
managerial employee influences the signing of the cards.1
5 7
If managerial employees are section 2(2) "employers," then the
employer is responsible for their conduct, both in unfair labor practice
and representation matters, whether or not he knows of or ratifies their
acts. 158 This would apply, for example, to threats, interrogations, or
151. See note 5 supra & note 177 infra.
152. See note 57 supra.
153. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
154. Nor would there be any remedy under any state statute. Beasley v. Food Fair,
Inc., 416 U.S. 653 (1974).
155. See note 55 supra.
156. See notes 57 & 144 supra.
157. Wolfe Metal Prods. Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 659 (1957); Desilu Prods., Inc.,
106 N.LR.B. 179 (1953). Moreover, if an employee determined to be managerial and
thereby a 2(11) supervisor files a decertification petition under section 9(c) (1) (A) (ii),
the petition will be dismissed. Custom Bronze & Aluminum Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. 397
(1972). Moreover, even though the petition was filed without his knowledge, the
employer will be in violation of section 8(a) (1). Suburban Homes Corp., 173 N.L.R.B.
497 (1968). But see Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 55 (1973).
158. On the subject of agency see Aircraft Plating Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 87
L.R.R.M. 1208 (1974) and cases cited therein. See also section 2(13) of the Act:
In determining whether any person is acting as an "agent" of another person so
as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the
specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not
be controlling.
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other interference by managerial employees, during organizing drives,
pre-election campaigns, and the election itself.159
VIII. THE REMAND DEcIsIoN-RouND 11?
The Board handed down its remand decision in July, 1975,160 and
while changing its rationale slightly, it retained the original effect.
The three member panel' 61 comprised of Chairman Murphy, 0 2 and
members Fanning and Jenkins found the buyers in question to be
employees within the meaning of the Act, and reaffirmed its earlier
bargaining order.168 Interestingly, the Board found but did not specifi-
cally state that the buyers were not managerial employees. It took its cue
from dicta in both the Second Circuit6 4 and Supreme Court'65 decisions
which implied that on the facts of the case the buyers in question were
not managerial employees.' 6 The Board set forth what it considered the
For a discussion of employer liability for interrogation by a managerial employee see
Beckett Aviation Corp., 218 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 89 L.R.R.M. 1341 (June 5, 1975).
159. If a low level managerial employee gave support to the union it is doubtful that
an election would be set aside, even if the individual was a supervisor. See Turner's Ex-
press, 189 N.L.R.B. 106 (1971); Stevenson Equip. Co., 174 N.L.R.B. 865 (1969).
Though there is no per se rule prohibiting the use of supervisors as observers at elections,
the practice is frowned upon. Howard Cooper Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 950 (1958); Owens-
Park Lumber Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 131 (1953). It is doubtful that the Board would allow
its processes to be abused by permitting punishment of those who testify or file charges.
Leas & McVitty, 155 N.L.R.B. 389 (1965); Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782
(1962). The managerial employee dilemma cuts in many directions. In certain cases
unions might be violating the Act by interfering with or attempting to discipline
managerial employees. This is so with respect to discipline of member supervisors.
Florida Power & Light Co. v. I.B.E.W., 417 U.S. 790 (1974); Daily Racing Forms, 216
N.L.R.B. No. 147, 88 L.R.R.M. 1384 (Mar. 6, 1975); Hammond Publishers, Inc., 216
N.L.R.B. No. 149, 88 L.R.R.M. 1378 (Mar. 6, 1975).
160. Bell Aerospace Co., 219 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 89 L.R.R.M. 1664 (July 23, 1975).
161. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1970) provides in pertinent part: "The Board is authorized
to delegate to any group of three or more members any or all of the powers which it
may itself exercise ...."
162. Betty Southard Murphy became the first woman Chairman of the Board on
February 5, 1975. BNA News and Background Information, 88 LAB. REL. REP. 113
(1975). Ms. Murphy prefers the usage of the title "Chairman."
163. Bell Aerospace Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 209 (1972). Bargaining orders are used to
remedy an employer's refusal to bargain with a duly certified representative. Cf. NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). See note 88 supra.
164. Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 494 (2d Cir. 1973).
165. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,290 & n.19 (1974).
166. On the merits of the case the court found that there was substantial evidence
that the Company's buyers were not sufficiently high in the managerial hierarchy
to constitute true managerial employees. It then added that, on proper proceedings,
the Board would not be precluded from determining that buyers or some types of
buyers were not true managerial employees covered by the Act.
Bell Aerospace Co., 219 N.L.R.B. No. 42, at slip 3, 89 L.R.R.M. 1664 (July 23, 1975).
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Supreme Courts view to be regarding the correct legal standard for
defining managerial employees, namely, "those who formulate, deter-
mine, and effectuate an Employer's policies."'167 This is consistent with
the restrictive position taken by the Board in its decisions since Bell.168
While the holding itself comes as no surprise, other portions of the
decision are troublesome. Not content to merely note the purely discre-
tionary functions performed by the buyers, the Board seems compelled
to return to its old haunts of "community of interest" and "conflict of
interest."'' 6 9
The "community of interest" analysis is curious. The Board points out
that the buyers share many traits common to other white collar employ-
ees already organized in other bargaining units. For example, their pay,
fringe benefits, and lunchroom facilities are similar to those of other
white collar employees in other bargaining units.170 'But the community
of interest test is normally used as a basis for including employees in the
same unit as that in which employees with the same community of
interest work. It has not been used to create separate and fragmented
units among employees sharing the same interests.'' Followed to its
logical conclusion it would seem that the Board's reasoning would serve
to establish the buyers as an "accretion!'" 72 to an already existing bar-
gaining unit of white collar workers.
The Board's continued preoccupation with "conflict of interest" is
ominous. It was the new "conflict of interest" touchstone that triggered
the wrath of the Second Circuit before, 73 and was instrumental in
contributing to the continuing confusion over the exact definition of
managerial employees.' 74 The Supreme Court did not specifically disap-
prove of the "confliot of interest" analysis, and it even implied that on
167. Id. at slip 5, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1665, quoting Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140
N.L.R.B. 569, 571 (1963).
168. See note 144 supra. The Board refers specifically to General Dynamics Corp.,
213 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 87 L.R.R.M. 1449 (1974); Bell Aerospace Co., 219 N.L.R.B. No.
42, at slip 6, 89 L.R.R.M. 1664, 1665 (July 23, 1975).
169. Bell Aerospace Co., 219 N.L.R.B. No. 124, at slip 8-9, 89 L.R.R.M. 1664, 1666
(July 23, 1975). See note 14 and text accompanying notes 91 & 99 supra.
170. Bell Aerospace Co., 219 N.L.R.B. No. 124, at 8-9, 89 L.R.R.M. 1664, 1666 (July
23, 1975).
171. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
172. "Accretion" is a term of art referring to an addition to an established bargaining
unit. Cf. CF&I Steel Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 470 (1972).
173. Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 495 (2d Cir. 1973).
174. Bell Aerospace Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 209 (1972); Bell Aerospace Co., 190 N.L.R.B.
431, 432 (1971); North Ark. Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550, 551 (1970).
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remand the Board should give serious consideration to reopening the
record to afford the parties an opportunity to adduce further evidence, if
any, of conflict of interest.175 The Board declined to reopen the
record,176 and it would seem that the Board is merely paying lip service
to the "conflict of interest" analysis while holding firm to its narrow
"supervisorial" definition.1 77
A break with the confused past of managerial employees would be
welcome, as the earlier hypothetical illustrates. The question, however, is
whether or not the Board and the courts will allow the new definition
and overlook earlier decisions such as Swift 78 and the many-faceted
rationales that preceded them. One can only speculate as to what the
Second and other circuits will do with Bell and its progeny.'
79
175. 416 U.S. at 290 n.20.
176. Chairman Murphy felt the employer was estopped to revive the conflict of
interest issue because it had failed to challenge the unit on any ground other than
managerial status. Bell Aerospace Co., 219 N.L.R.B. No. 124, at slip 9 n. 11, 89 L.R.R.M.
1664, 1666 n.1l (July 23, 1975).
177. General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 87 L.R.R.M. 1449 (1974). See
note 144 supra.
Two cases issued around the Bell remand point to an opposite conclusion, namely, that
the Board is still casting about, applying the managerial employee tag to a broad variety
of lower level employees. In Beckett Aviation Corp., 218 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 89 L.R.R.M.
1341 (June 5, 1975), the Administrative Law Judge held the employer liable for unlaw-
ful interrogation of its employees by a buyer whom the judge had concluded was a
managerial employee. The Board reversed the judge because the interrogation had
occurred beyond the six months statute of limitations (29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970)). It
did imply, however, that the employee in question was managerial. 218 N.L.R.B. at slip
3, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1342. See note 159 supra and accompanying text.
In Curtis Noll Corp., 218 N.L.R.B. No. 222, 89 L.R.R.M. 1417 (June 30, 1975), a
full five member panel with only member Fanning dissenting at length (see id. at slip 4-
10, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1417-20) held that management trainees were managerial employees,
even though they possessed no criteria of such at the time of the decision and had only
an expectation of becoming managers. The employees involved were discharged during
an organizing campaign in the office clerical unit where the trainees were employed. The
trainees did the same work as the other employees in the office clerical unit. In finding
that the trainees had no remedy under the Act, the Board relied once again on "conflict
of interest" language. There is no discussion of the effect of the discharges on the
organizational drive. See note 157 supra and accompanying text.
178. Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956). That decision was overruled by the Board
in North Ark. Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550, 551 n.8 (1970), but on the
ground that the employees in question were entitled to the protection of the Act
notwithstanding their status as managerial employees.
179. It is probable that the Second Circuit would grant enforcement in view of its
broad hint to the Board that the buyers are not managerial employees as traditionally
defined: "inhere was substantial evidence that Bell's buyers were not sufficiently high
in the hierarchy to constitute 'managerial employees' . . . ." Bell Aerospace Co. v.
NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 494 (2d Cir. 1973).
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IX. 'CONCLUSION
The Board appears to be putting the long saga of the managerial
employee to rest °80 by adhering to a restricted definition of managerial
employee. Under this definition only high level executives who would
likewise be supervisors under the Act would qualify as managerial
employees. Under this analysis, the use of the managerial employee
exclusion would apply only as a subcategory to those already excluded
as supervisors.
If such an approach withstands the scrutiny of the courts, the Bell
decision will have little significance since no new group of employees
will have been excluded from the rights and protections of the Act.
If, however, the courts disapprove of the new definition, 81 or out
of confusion, broaden its application, then the status of the law will
remain unsettled, needless litigation will follow, and the numbers of
employees unprotected by the Act will continue to grow unless Congress
defines more precisely those employees entitled to the protection of the
Act.
Andrew J. Stites
180. A final result of the Supreme Court decision which seems clear is that confiden-
tial employees are likewise excluded from the protection of the Act. The legislative
analysis applied to managerial employees will apply a fortiori to confidential employees.
See notes 122 & 124 supra and accompanying text. Of special interest is the dissenting
opinion of member Kennedy in Flintkote, 217 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 89 L.R.R.M. 1295
(1975).
181. The California Supreme Court recently adopted the Bell rationale for cases
arising under California law only. Fire Fighters Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12
Cal. 3d 618, 526 P.2d 978, 116 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1974). The exclusion of managerial
employees is not specifically mentioned in the recent Agricultural Labor Relations Act,
but precedents under the Act are binding by statute. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1140 et seq.
(West Supp. 1975).
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